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THE “P” WORD: OHIO SHOULD ADOPT THE 
UNIFORM PREMARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT TO 
ACHIEVE CONSISTENCY AND UNIFORMITY IN 
THE TREATMENT OF PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENTS
JENNA CHRISTINE COLUCCI*
ABSTRACT
Throughout the United States, courts have used inconsistent standards for the 
interpretation of prenuptial agreements. Under Ohio jurisprudence, courts are 
concerned with protecting the vulnerable spouse, or the economically disadvantaged 
party. This legal standard acknowledges the unique relationship of the parties to the 
contract and will generally review the procedural and substantive components of the 
prenuptial agreement. Conversely, other courts are weary of interfering with the 
contractual freedom of the parties and will only invalidate a prenuptial agreement upon 
a showing of fraud, duress, or misrepresentation. The Uniform Premarital Agreements 
Act was drafted in 1983 to address the inconsistent treatment of prenuptial agreements 
on a multi-jurisdictional basis. To date, twenty-seven states have adopted the Act. 
Ohio’s adoption of the Act would clarify the rights and responsibilities of parties to 
prenuptial agreements. In addition, subsequent adoption of the Act in all states would 
guarantee reliable prenuptial agreements which could withstand judicial scrutiny in all 
United States jurisdictions.
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I.    INTRODUCTION
Husband speaking to his lawyer: “Are you telling me that I need a lawyer in 
Nevada, where our marriage took place, another lawyer in Ohio, where we signed the 
prenuptial agreement, and a third lawyer in New York, where my ex and our children 
live? Is that what you are saying?” This dramatic conversation is not a legal stretch 
from the truth. In our modern and mobile society, dissolving marriages and the 
subsequent enforcement of prenuptial agreements can create multi-jurisdictional 
nightmares as portrayed herein. To exacerbate this issue, courts in various jurisdictions 
often apply competing standards when interpreting prenuptial agreements. These 
distinctive standards, which govern prenuptial agreement interpretations, contribute 
significantly to the uncertain and non-uniform treatment of prenuptial agreements in 
the United States.
To illustrate, in the 1970s, Dr. Frederick A. Simeone, a 39-year-old neurosurgeon, 
married Catherine E. Walsh Simeone, a 23-year-old registered nurse, in 
Pennsylvania.1 At the time, Mr. Simeone’s approximate annual income was $90,000.2
Mrs. Simeone, however, was unemployed.3 The day before the wedding, Mrs. 
Simeone signed a prenuptial agreement prepared by her husband’s attorney without 
the assistance of her own counsel.4 The agreement capped Mrs. Simeone’s spousal 
support at $25,000, paid in weekly increments of $200.5 In 1984, the parties 
commenced divorce proceedings.6 Mrs. Simeone argued that the agreement was 
unreasonable because she misunderstood the nature of alimony pendente lite7 when 
she relinquished it in the agreement; thus, the agreement should not be enforced.8 The 
lower court rejected her arguments.9 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the 
lower court’s ruling, finding that “the agreement was entered into after full and fair 
disclosure of assets and that there was an absence of duress.”10
                                                          
1 Simeone v. Simeone, 551 A.2d 219, 224 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
2 Simeone v. Simeone, 581 A.2d 162, 163 (Pa. 1990).
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Alimony pendente lite refers to spousal support payments paid during the pendency of a 
divorce proceeding. CORDELL & CORDELL, P.C., What Is Alimony Pendente Lite?,
DADSDIVORCE.COM (Oct. 1, 2012), http://dadsdivorce.com/articles/what-is-alimony-pendente-
lite/.
8 Simeone, 581 A.2d at 164.
9 Id.
10 Id.
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Under Ohio antenuptial laws, Simeone would have been decided differently. In 
Simeone, the court interpreted premarital agreements using the same principles applied 
to other contracts; the terms of their agreements should bind spouses absent a showing 
of fraud, misrepresentation, or duress.11 Conversely, prenuptial agreements enforced 
in Ohio “must meet certain minimum standards of good faith and fair dealing.12 If the 
premarital agreement is fair and reasonable under the circumstances, it will be deemed 
enforceable.”13 Henceforth, unlike Simeone’s traditional, contractual interpretation 
predicated on freedom of contracts, Ohio’s conservative standard requires compliance 
with procedural and substantive mechanisms to protect a vulnerable spouse, to wit, 
the economically disadvantaged party.14 Accordingly, under Ohio jurisprudence, the 
court in Simeone would have considered facts such as, the close proximity between 
the agreement’s execution and the wedding; the husband’s attorney’s role in drafting 
the agreement; the inequality of bargaining power resulting from the husband’s 
attorney’s role; the lack of independent counsel representing the wife; and, the 
unreasonable nature of spousal support where a substantial disparity of income exists 
between the parties.15
Considering these facts, an Ohio court may have concluded that the circumstances 
surrounding the execution of the prenuptial agreement and the substantive provisions 
of the agreement were unfair. Because Simeone rejected a reasonableness approach, 
permitting the court to evaluate the reasonableness of such agreements,16 an Ohio 
court would likely have held the Simeone prenuptial agreement unenforceable for the 
aforementioned reasons. Therefore, eliminating these competing standards and 
adopting uniform standards would provide universal guidelines on the drafting and 
interpretation of prenuptial agreements. Such uniformity would allow couples to 
create binding, legal premarital contracts, likely to withstand judicial scrutiny across 
multiple jurisdictions.
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws drafted the 
Uniform Premarital Agreement Act (“UPAA”) in 1983 to address the inconsistent 
treatment of prenuptial agreements on a multi-jurisdictional basis.17 To date, twenty-
seven states have adopted the UPAA, either in full or in some modified capacity.18
The UPAA adopts accepted standards of existing state laws governing the 
                                                          
11 Id. at 165.
12 Zimmie v. Zimmie, 464 N.E.2d 142, 146 (Ohio 1984).
13 Id.
14 See, e.g., id. (focusing on the absence of independent legal counsel for the former wife 
and her testimony that she did not understand the agreement); Gross v. Gross, 464 N.E.2d 500, 
504 (Ohio 1984) (“To require Wife to return from this opulent standard of living to that which 
would be required . . . [by the agreement] could well occasion a hardship or be significantly 
difficult for the former wife”).
15 See Simeone, 581 A.2d at 163–64.
16 Id. at 162.
17 Jill Heitler Blomberg, Unconscionability: The Heart of the Uniform Premarital 
Agreement Act, 15 AM. J. FAM. L. 131, 131 (2001).
18 Jeremy D. Morley, Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, INT’L PRENUPTIALS 
AGREEMENTS—EXPERIENCED INT’L COUNS., http://www.internationalprenuptials.com/uniform-
prenuptial-agreements-act.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2016).
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enforcement of prenuptial agreements.19 Under these standards, prenuptial agreements 
must be in writing, signed by both parties, and executed freely and voluntarily; they 
also require that potential spouses have adequate knowledge of each other's property 
and finances.20 The UPAA also provides a flexible framework by excluding nothing 
from the scope of the agreement except criminal or unconscionable matters.21 Ohio 
has neither adopted nor introduced any version of the UPAA; therefore, Ohio’s 
common law and applicable state statutes govern enforcement of prenuptial 
agreements executed in Ohio.22
This Note argues that Ohio’s adoption of the UPAA would clarify the rights and 
responsibilities surrounding prenuptial agreements and that subsequent adoption of 
the Act in all jurisdictions would facilitate uniformity through consistent treatment of 
prenuptial agreements across state lines. Many couples in the United States reside in 
several states during their marriage.23 Moreover, prospective spouses are increasingly 
aware of the need to settle marital issues between themselves before marriage.24 Thus, 
if Ohio and all states adopt the UPAA, prospective spouses will no longer worry about 
renegotiating their prenuptial agreements whenever they move to a new jurisdiction.
Part I of this Note analyzes two Supreme Court of Ohio cases involving prenuptial 
agreements and the law derived therefrom. Part II discusses the focus of Ohio’s 
prenuptial agreements—specifically, the protection of the vulnerable spouse—and 
compares it to the UPAA’s focus—that parties should be free, within broad limits, to 
choose the financial terms of their marriage.25 Part III sets forth the UPAA’s accepted 
state standards and flexible framework and argues that Ohio should adopt the UPAA 
because it will enable prospective spouses to legally and contractually organize their 
affairs in a valid and binding instrument of law.26 Finally, Part IV will rebut the 
prevailing counterargument that the Uniform Premarital and Marital Agreement Act 
(“UPMAA”) “achieve[s] greater consistency in the way in which the states enforce 
premarital agreements,”27 but finds that many states may be reluctant to adopt the 
UPMAA because a majority of these jurisdictions already enacted laws treating 
prenuptial agreements as ordinary contracts.
                                                          
19 Why States Should Adopt UPAA, UNIF. L. COMM’N—NAT’L CONF. COMM’RS ON UNIF.
ST. LS.,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Narrative.aspx?title=Why%20States%20Should%20Adopt%20U
PAA (last visited Nov. 3, 2016) [hereinafter ULC, Why States Should Adopt UPAA].
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Kristina Otterstrom, Prenuptial Agreements in Ohio: A Look at the Basics of Prenuptial 
Agreements in Ohio, DIVORCENET.COM, http://www.divorcenet.com/resources/prenuptial-
agreements-ohio.html (last visited Aug. 27, 2017).
23 ULC, Why States Should Adopt UPAA, supra note 19.
24 Id.
25 UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1983).
26 ULC, Why States Should Adopt UPAA, supra note 19.
27 UNIF. PREMARITAL AND MARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2012); Carlyn 
S. McCaffrey, Except as Provided in Article Five, I Endow Thee with All My Worldly Goods—
The New Uniform Premarital and Marital Agreement Act, NAECP J. EST. & TAX PLAN., July–
Sept. 2014, at 11.
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II.    BACKGROUND
A prenuptial agreement is a “written contract between two people who are about 
to marry, setting out the terms of possession of assets, treatment of future earnings, 
control of the property of each, and potential division if the marriage is later 
dissolved.”28 Currently, every state recognizes the validity of divorce-focused 
prenuptial agreements.29 Until the mid-1970s, most courts held that premarital 
agreements and other contracts made “in contemplation of divorce” were 
unenforceable, reasoning that the “agreements were void either [(1)] because they 
purported to alter the state-imposed terms of the status of marriage, which were not 
subject to individual alteration, or (2) because they tended to encourage divorce.”30
This theory of premarital agreements has changed considerably over the past thirty 
years.31
Today, couples often execute a prenuptial agreement in preparation for divorce 
rather than death.32 Moreover, society has witnessed an “increasing awareness among 
prospective marital partners of the need to settle issues of property and income 
between themselves before marriage.”33 As a result, “[sixty-three] percent of divorce 
attorneys surveyed by the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers said they had 
seen an increase in the number of prenuptial agreements drafted in recent years.”34
Thus, the need for uniform standards and consistent treatment of prenuptial 
agreements across state lines is a contemporary issue of premarital law.
A.    Prenuptial Agreement Reform
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws drafted the 
UPAA to “remove substantial uncertainty as to the enforceability of all, or a portion, 
of the provisions of [prenuptial] agreements.”35 Prior to its enactment, the protection 
of the vulnerable spouse and the conventional, contractual freedom juxtaposition was 
rampant; some courts interpreted prenuptial agreements in consideration of the 
vulnerable spouse, while others adhered to conventional, contract law to guide the 
interpretation and enforceability of prenuptial agreements.36
For example, Georgia courts often invalidated a prenuptial agreement based on a 
showing of three elements: “(1) was the agreement obtained through fraud, duress or 
                                                          
28 ROSEMARY DURKIN & TRISHA ZELLER, OHIO PROBATE § 3.02 (2d ed. 2017).
29 Brian Bix, Bargaining in the Shadow of Love: The Enforcement of Premarital 
Agreements and How We Think About Marriage, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 145, 158 (1998).
30 Id. at 150.
31 Id. at 148.
32 Id. at 149.
33 Premarital Agreement Act Summary, UNIF. L. COMM’N—NAT’L CONF. COMM’RS ON 
UNIF. ST. LS.,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Premarital%20Agreement%20Act (last 
visited Nov. 3, 2016) [hereinafter ULC, Summary].
34 Kelli B. Grant, Prenups: Not Just for the 1 Percent, CNBC.COM (Jan. 20, 2015), 
http://www.cnbc.com/2015/01/20/prenups-not-just-for-the-1-percent.html.
35 Peter T. Lesson & Joshua Pierson, Prenups, 45 J. LEGAL STUD. 367, 371 (2016).
36 Id.
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mistake, or through misrepresentation or nondisclosure of material facts? (2) Is the 
agreement unconscionable? (3) Have the facts and circumstances changed since the 
agreement was executed, so as to make its enforcement unfair and unreasonable?”37
Such a standard is analogous to Ohio’s current prenuptial agreement law, protecting 
the vulnerable spouse.38 However, in Oregon, courts favor the enforcement of 
prenuptial agreements and, because of the fiduciary relationship of the parties, hold 
prospective spouses to a “punctilious standard of performing their agreement.”39 For 
example, in In re Moore’s Estate,40 the former husband relinquished his rights to the 
wife’s real property. The issue was whether the parties to an intended marriage 
contract may waive their statutory rights to the disposition of real and personal 
property.41 The court concluded that “such waiver can be effected by a prenuptial
agreement which is otherwise valid.”42 This stringent interpretation of the validity of 
the prenuptial agreement did not consider whether the former husband had access to 
independent legal counsel or whether he understood the rights that he was 
relinquishing.43 This interpretation is analogous to the contractual freedom standard, 
ignoring the reasonableness of the agreement.44
Prior to the enactment of the UPAA, the enforceability of prenuptial agreements 
was uncertain. Prenuptial agreements were held to a higher standard than conventional 
contracts; they had to pass both procedural and substantive fairness tests under 
doctrines such as unconscionability, fraud, and duress.45 A majority of courts required 
evidence that the parties consulted with independent legal counsel, that the parties 
disclosed their monetary assets, that any spousal rights were waived with full 
knowledge of those rights, and that the terms of the agreement were not damaging to 
the interests of the party against whom enforcement was sought.46 This interpretive 
standard combined with the prevalence of competing standards for interpreting 
prenuptial agreements culminated in the creation of the UPAA.47
According to commentators, the UPAA has achieved uniform treatment in 
enforcement of prenuptial agreements in many parts of the United States since its 
enactment.48 They contend that “the UPAA provides for the full enforcement of 
prenuptial agreements as created by their signatories excepting but two 
                                                          
37 Scherer v. Scherer, 292 S.E.2d 662, 639 (Ga. 1982).
38 See Gross, 464 N.E.2d at 511 (determining an agreement’s substantive fairness by 
considering the parties’ changed circumstances).
39 In re Moore’s Estate, 307 P.2d 483, 488 (Or. 1957).
40 Id. at 489.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 492.
43 Id. at 488.
44 See id.
45 Lesson & Pierson, supra note 35, at 370.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id.
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circumstances.”49 However, while states that have adopted the UPAA may move 
closer toward uniform treatment of prenuptial agreements, the uncertainty of 
enforcement still concerns couples who seek enforcement in the twenty-three states 
that have not adopted the UPAA.50 Thus, to achieve consistency and uniform treatment 
of prenuptial agreements throughout the United States, Ohio also must adopt the 
UPAA. 
B.    Ohio’s Prenuptial Agreement Laws
In Ohio, prenuptial agreements must meet certain minimum standards of good 
faith and fair dealing.51 If the agreement is fair and reasonable under the 
circumstances, it will be deemed enforceable.52 Such agreements are valid and 
enforceable if three basic conditions are met: “one, they have been entered into freely 
without fraud, duress, coercion or overreaching; two, if there was a full disclosure, or 
full knowledge, and understanding, of the nature, value and extent of the prospective 
spouse's property; and, three, if the terms do not promote or encourage divorce or 
profiteering by divorce.”53 For the first element, a presumption of overreaching or 
coercion in a prenuptial agreement arises when there is “unfairness or inequity in the 
result of the agreement or in its procurement.”54 The agreement satisfies the second 
element when the parties attach as an exhibit the parties’ assets, or alternatively, when 
other instrumentalities demonstrate that the parties gave a full disclosure.55 The third 
element is present when “the prenuptial agreement provides a significant sum by way 
of either property settlement or alimony at the time of divorce and after a short period 
of time, one of the parties abandons the marriage or disregards their vows.”56 Thus,
these premarital laws govern the court’s analysis in a judicial proceeding to interpret 
the validity of a prenuptial agreement.57
                                                          
49 Id. Those two circumstances, listed in the Prefatory Note of the UPAA, are as follows:
[I]f the party against whom enforcement is sought proves that (a) he or she did not 
execute the agreement voluntarily or that (b) the agreement was unconscionable when 
it was executed and, before execution of the agreement, he or she (1) was not provided 
a fair and reasonable disclosure of the property or financial obligations of the other 
party, (2) did not voluntarily and expressly waive, in writing, any right to disclosure of 
the property or financial obligations of the other party beyond the disclosure provided, 
and (3) did not have, or reasonably could not have had, an adequate knowledge of the 
property and financial obligations of the other party.
UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT prefatory n. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1983).
50 See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT prefatory n. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1983).
51 Zimmie v. Zimmie, 464 N.E.2d 142, 146 (Ohio 1984).
52 Id. (first citing Gross v. Gross, 464 N.E.2d 500, 504 (Ohio 1984); then citing Hook v. 
Hook, 431 N.E.2d 667 (Ohio 1982)).
53 Gross, 464 N.E.2d at 506.
54 Harbom v. Harbom, 760 A.2d 272, 275 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000).
55 Gross, 464 N.E.2d at 506.
56 Id.
57 Id.
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Ohio has several additional procedural requirements to execute a valid prenuptial 
agreement. First, couples have a duty to disclose all assets—including property, 
money, and personal debts.58 Second, Ohio law requires at least two witnesses present 
when a couple signs their prenuptial agreement.59 Third, “[t]he presentation of an 
agreement a very short time before the wedding ceremony will create a presumption 
of overreaching or coercion if the postponement of the wedding would cause 
significant hardship, embarrassment or emotional stress”60 because courts want 
prospective spouses to have time to “contemplate the seriousness of the agreement and 
its legal consequences.”61 Finally, “all issues related to child support, custody and 
visitation included in a prenuptial agreement will not be enforced by the court . . . 
because these issues are decided by the court based upon what is in the child’s best 
interest.”62 The court will equitably distribute the couple’s property if it renders a 
prenuptial agreement unenforceable; “the court will divide . . . marital property in a 
manner that it deems fair, but not necessarily equal.”63 Accordingly, in Ohio, the 
aforementioned substantive and procedural rules create valid prenuptial agreements 
that courts are bound to uphold.
C.    The UPAA’s Governing Rules for Prenuptial Agreements
Other jurisdictions incorporated valuable principles from the UPAA by enacting 
prenuptial agreement legislation. Section Two of the UPAA sets forth formalities 
necessary to construct a binding, legal prenuptial agreement.64 Under the UPAA, the 
only requirements for a binding prenuptial agreement are that the agreement is in 
writing and signed by both parties.65 A few states that adopted the UPAA, however, 
require additional formalities, such as “notarization or an acknowledgment for the 
agreement to be enforceable.”66
Section Three of the UPAA establishes standards of enforceability for prenuptial 
agreements.67 These standards allow prospective spouses to customize an agreement’s 
content to include “all subject matters except those that are criminal or 
                                                          
58 Elizabeth Stock, Ohio’s Prenuptial Agreement Laws, LEGALZOOM,
http://info.legalzoom.com/ohios-prenuptial-agreement-laws-25982.html (last visited Nov. 3, 
2016).
59 Id.
60 Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, No. 11CA0103-M, 2013 Ohio App. LEXIS 1121, 2013 WL 
1286012, at ¶ 22 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 27, 2013) (quoting Fletcher v. Fletcher 628 N.E.2d 1343, 
1348 (Ohio 1994)).
61 Stock, supra note 58.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 2 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1983).
66 Amberlynn Curry, The Uniform Premarital Agreement Act and Its Variations 
Throughout the States, 23 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 355, 359 (2010).
67 UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 3 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1983).
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unconscionable.”68 Moreover, parties may contract to the disposition of property upon 
separation; marital dissolution or the occurrence or nonoccurrence of an event; the 
modification or elimination of spousal support; the choice of law governing the 
construction of the agreement; and any other matter, including their personal rights 
and obligations not in violation of public policy or a statute imposing a criminal 
penalty.69
Currently, courts in various jurisdictions disagree on whether prospective spouses 
should be permitted to control spousal support provisions in their prenuptial
agreements.70 The UPAA’s position on this issue is that married couples may set forth 
spousal support provisions as long as enforcement of spousal support does not leave 
one party eligible for public assistance.71
Lastly, Section Six of the UPAA provides that a party may avoid enforcement of 
a prenuptial agreement by showing that (1) the agreement was not voluntarily executed
and (2) “the agreement was unconscionable when executed and before execution of 
the agreement and, the party was not provided a fair and reasonable disclosure of the 
property or financial obligations of the other party.”72 Collectively, the 
aforementioned rules govern enforcement of prenuptial agreements in jurisdictions 
that have adopted the UPAA.
D.    Two Competing Standards Under Which Courts Analyze the Validity of 
Prenuptial Agreements
When interpreting prenuptial agreements in the United States, some jurisdictions 
focus their analysis on protecting the vulnerable spouse.73 Such jurisdictions 
acknowledge the unique relationship of the parties to the contract and will generally 
review the “reasonableness” of the agreement.74 Ohio adheres to this approach. The 
Supreme Court of Ohio expressly acknowledged that “[prenuptial] agreements are 
contracts and generally the law of contracts applies to their interpretation and 
application . . . but [n]evertheless, [Ohio] has recognized that these agreements 
                                                          
68 ULC, Why States Should Adopt UPAA, supra note 19; see generally Unconscionable,
THEFREEDICTIONARY.COM, http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/unconscionable (last 
visited Aug. 31, 2017) (“In contract law, an unconscionable contract is one that is unjust or 
extremely one-sided in favor of the person who has the superior bargaining power”).
69 UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 3 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1983).
70 Id. § 3 cmt.
71 Id. at prefatory n.; but cf. DAWN GRAY & STEPHEN JAMES WAGNER, COMPLEX ISSUES IN 
CALIFORNIA FAMILY LAW ch. K7.01 (2016 ed., Matthew Bender & Co. 2016) (quoting In re
Marriage of Melissa, 151 Cal. Rptr. 3d 608, 616 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012)) (arguing that courts 
should be free to challenge universal assumptions underlying the “common law rule that 
premarital spousal support waivers promote dissolution and for that reason contravene public 
policy”).
72 UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1983); but cf. Ohio’s 
judicially-imposed requirement that parties provide a “full” disclosure of assets, unlike the 
UPAA’s requirement of a “reasonable” disclosure. Gross v. Gross, 464 N.E.2d 500, 501 (Ohio 
1984) (enforcing prenuptial agreement because there was a full disclosure of monetary assets 
between the parties).
73 See, e.g., Fletcher v. Fletcher, 628 N.E.2d 1343 (Ohio 1994).
74 Simeone v. Simeone, 581 A.2d 162, 165 (Pa. 1990).
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constitute a special type of contract to which certain special rules apply.”75 Hence, 
these “special rules”76 guide Ohio courts in determining whether the prenuptial 
agreement “is fair and reasonable under all the facts and circumstances.”77
Other jurisdictions, specifically those that have adopted the UPAA, focus their 
analysis on well-settled principles of contract law: “[a]bsent fraud, misrepresentation, 
or duress, spouses should be bound by terms of their agreements.”78 The rationale is 
that prenuptial agreements are contracts, and as such, should be evaluated under same 
criteria applicable to other types of contracts.79 In analyzing the validity of a prenuptial 
agreement, some courts decline to consider whether the parties effectuated reasonable 
or good bargains;80 yet, “if a court finds that a [prenuptial agreement] is so one-sided 
that it is unjustly unfair to one spouse, the contract could be thrown out.”81 If a 
prenuptial agreement favors one party, however, a court will not automatically deem 
the agreement “unfair.”82 Generally, courts enforce these agreements in jurisdictions 
that adhere to this contract theory of prenuptial agreements as long as one spouse is 
left “something.”83 As a result, courts applying the UPAA evaluate prenuptial 
agreements under traditional rules of contract law.
E.    The UPMAA’s Framework
The Uniform Law Commission (“ULC”) approved the UPMAA at its annual 
conference on July 18, 2012.84 The ULC drafted the Act in response to criticism of 
the UPAA, intending the new Act to supersede the UPAA.85 Critics opined that the 
UPAA lacked protection for the vulnerable spouse and that state variations of the 
UPAA were significant, preventing uniform treatment of prenuptial agreements.86
Initially, the UPMAA broadened the scope of the UPAA’s framework. Under the 
UPAA, a prenuptial agreement was unenforceable if the parties included a provision 
adversely affecting a child’s right to child support.87 In Section Ten of the UPMAA, 
                                                          
75 Fletcher, 628 N.E.2d at 1346 (emphasis added).
76 See id.
77 Gross, 464 N.E.2d at 512.
78 Simeone, 581 A.2d at 165.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Thomas Wayne, The Risk of Do-It-Yourself Prenuptial Agreements, LEGALZOOM,
http://info.legalzoom.com/risks-doityourself-prenuptial-agreements-26448.html (last visited 
Oct. 16, 2016).
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 McCaffrey, supra note 27, at 10–11.
85 UNIF. PREMARITAL AND MARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT prefatory n. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N
2012).
86 Id. (“Over the years, commentators have offered a variety of criticisms of that Act, many 
arguing that it was weighted too strongly in favor of enforcement, and was insufficiently 
protective of vulnerable parties”).
87 McCaffrey, supra note 27, at 12.
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the ULC expanded this concept of unenforceable provisions.88 Section Ten instructs 
states to invalidate certain provisions, such as clauses that define “the rights and 
obligations of the parties regarding child custody, that limit or restrict a remedy 
available to a victim of domestic violence, that purport to modify the grounds for a 
court-decreed separation or marital dissolution,” or that similarly offend public 
policy.89
In addition, Section Nine provides grounds for avoiding enforcement of the 
prenuptial agreement.90 Here, the parties to the prenuptial agreement must enter into 
the agreement voluntarily, and both parties must have access to independent legal 
counsel.91 If the parties lack independent counsel, the agreement must include a notice 
of waiver of marital rights, and the parties must have adequately disclosed their 
assets.92
The UPMAA gives courts discretion to invalidate a provision of a prenuptial 
agreement if unconscionable at the time of signing.93 In contrast, under the UPAA, 
“unconscionability provides a basis for refusal to enforce an agreement only if the 
party against whom the agreement is being enforced did not have fair and reasonable 
disclosure of the property and financial obligations of the other party.”94 Thus, the 
UPMAA’s framework affords more protection for vulnerable spouses by expanding 
the UPAA’s concepts of unenforceability and grounds for avoiding enforcement.
III.    PROOF OF CLAIM
A.    Ohio’s Common Law Rules Regulating the Enforcement of Prenuptial 
Agreements
In 1984, the Supreme Court of Ohio issued written opinions for two prenuptial 
agreement cases. The first, Zimmie v. Zimmie,95 involved William and Kathryn 
Zimmie, who married in 1963 after executing a prenuptial agreement.96 In 1977, Mrs. 
Zimmie filed for divorce, alleging extreme cruelty and gross neglect.97 Mr. Zimmie 
filed counterclaims on the same grounds and further alleged that the couple’s 
prenuptial agreement precluded Mrs. Zimmie’s claims for alimony and division of 
property.98 The trial court found the prenuptial agreement invalid as a matter of law 
“on the basis that there had not been a full disclosure of assets by the defendant and 
there was insufficient evidence to show that the wife had knowledge as to the amount 
                                                          
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Zimmie v. Zimmie, 464 N.E.2d 142, 142 (Ohio 1984).
96 Id. at 143.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 144.
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of such assets.”99 The court concluded that Mrs. Zimmie entered into the agreement 
involuntarily and awarded her $1,425,000, “payable in installments over a period of 
nineteen years, or until her death, remarriage or cohabitation . . . as a combination of 
sustenance alimony and division of property.”100
The issue raised on appeal was whether the trial court erred in declaring the 
prenuptial agreement unenforceable.101 The appellate court began its analysis by
formulating well-settled principles of marital law:
Although [prenuptial] agreements are not per se invalid, they must meet 
certain minimum standards of good faith and fair dealing. If the agreement 
is fair and reasonable under the circumstances, it will be deemed 
enforceable. The prospective spouse must be fully and accurately apprised 
of the nature, value, and extent of the property affected by the agreement, 
and must enter into it voluntarily.102
Applying law to facts, the court inferred that Mrs. Zimmie first saw the agreement 
on the eve of the wedding and that the parties did not discuss the terms of the 
agreement beforehand.103 Moreover, the court found that Mrs. Zimmie signed the 
agreement at her husband’s attorney’s office without reading its entire content.104 Mrs. 
Zimmie testified that no one informed her that signing the agreement waived her 
marital rights to Mr. Zimmie’s property and that Mr. Zimmie failed to disclose to her 
the value of his corporate assets.105 Furthermore, she testified that she felt obligated to 
sign the agreement.106 As a result, the court found sufficient “evidence . . . to support 
the conclusion that [Mrs. Zimmie] did not voluntarily enter into the agreement with a 
full disclosure of the defendant's financial worth.”107 Thus, the court refused to hold 
that the trial court erred in this matter.108
In Ohio, judges focus on the procedural fairness of prenuptial agreements or the 
circumstances surrounding their execution.109 Courts in many states require evidence 
of procedural fairness before courts will validate a prenuptial agreement;110 however, 
                                                          
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 146.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 147.
109 “Procedural unconscionability is about the actions of the parties and not about the actual 
operation of the agreement.” Paul Bennet Marrow, Squeezing Subjectivity from the Doctrine of 
Unconscionability, 53 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 187, 193 (2005).
110 See Stewart v. Stewart, 76 A.3d 1221, 1223 (Md. 2013) (“The prevailing view is that 
both procedural and substantive unconscionability must be present in order for a court to 
invalidate a contractual term as unconscionable”); but see Simeone v. Simeone, 581 A.2d 162, 
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courts disagree on what exigent circumstances suffice to establish procedural 
unconscionability.111 Under the UPAA, issues of procedural unconscionability in 
prenuptial agreements are questions of law for the courts to decide.112 Adoption of the 
UPAA, in Ohio and all other states, would, at minimum, require judges to scrutinize 
prenuptial agreements for procedural unconscionability. To promote uniformity, the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws may amend the 
UPAA’s guidelines for courts to better define what constitutes procedural 
unconscionability for purposes of the Act.113 Although some critics claim Ohio’s 
common law treatment of prenuptial agreements already conforms to the UPAA’s 
enforcement requirements of procedural fairness, this argument is insufficient.114
Ohio’s adoption of the UPAA would promote uniformity by requiring courts to 
scrutinize prenuptial agreements for procedural fairness without significantly altering 
Ohio’s prenuptial agreement laws.
In Gross v. Gross,115 Thomas and Jane Gross executed a prenuptial agreement 
before they married in September of 1968.116 The parties’ agreement limited Mrs. 
Gross’s alimony to $200 per month for a period of ten years.117 The agreement also
stipulated that she was not entitled to any division of Mr. Gross’s property nor to any 
expense money or counsel fees in connection with any separation or divorce.118 Mrs. 
Gross agreed to waive any and all such rights in the agreement119 and signed the final 
version of the agreement against the advice of her counsel.120
Twelve years later, Mrs. Gross filed for divorce; the court granted the divorce on 
grounds of extreme cruelty attributable to Mr. Gross.121 Evidence adduced at trial 
indicated that Mr. Gross “increased his total assets to $8,000,000 with a net equity of 
                                                          
171 (Pa. 1990) (declining to review whether the prenuptial agreement was substantively fair, 
but upholding the agreement where it is procedurally conscionable).
111 For example, compare Simeone, 581 A.2d at 166, in which one court refused to render 
the prenuptial agreement void merely because the wife did not obtain independent legal counsel, 
with In re Marriage of Shanks, 758 N.W.2d 506, 518 (Iowa 2008), in which another court 
explained several factors to be considered when determining procedural unconscionability, 
including the opportunity to seek independent legal counsel.
112 UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1983).
113 See generally UNIF. PREMARITAL AND MARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT prefatory n. (UNIF.
LAW COMM’N 2012) (discussing the inconsistencies among the states’ various legal standards 
for premarital and marital agreements enforced by state courts).
114 See generally Randolph Carl Oppenheimer, The Antenuptial Contract in Ohio, 28 CAS.
W. RES. L. REV. 1040 (1978) (explaining the long history behind the procedural shortcomings 
in Ohio premarital contract enforcement).
115 Gross v. Gross, 464 N.E.2d 500, 501 (Ohio 1984).
116 Id. at 503.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 502.
121 Id.
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$6,000,000.”122 In addition, his gross income for the year 1980 was approximately 
$250,000.123 The trial court upheld the prenuptial agreement as valid and enforceable 
because Mr. Gross fully disclosed his assets, and none of the evidence demonstrated 
fraud, duress, or misrepresentation.124 The appellate court found that “inasmuch as the 
divorce had been granted upon the trial court's finding that Mr. Gross had been guilty 
of gross neglect of duty, he had thereby breached the [prenuptial] agreement and could 
not enforce its provisions against Mrs. Gross.”125 Mr. Gross appealed this decision to 
the Supreme Court of Ohio, which held:
[S]uch agreements are valid and enforceable if three basic conditions are 
met: one, if they have been entered into freely without fraud, duress, 
coercion or overreaching; two, if there was a full disclosure, or full 
knowledge, and understanding, of the nature, value and extent of the 
prospective spouse's property; and, three, if the terms do not promote or 
encourage divorce or profiteering by divorce.126
The court noted that historically, courts treat provisions in prenuptial agreements 
relating to division of property and alimony upon the parties’ divorce differently from 
other provisions.127 Courts hold such agreements, made in contemplation of divorce, 
void as against public policy.128 The court reasoned that “in the last decade and a half 
many changes have taken place in the attitudes and mores surrounding marriage and 
marital relationships,” and “these changes have altered the public policy view toward 
[prenuptial] agreements made in contemplation of a possible divorce.”129 The court 
identified influential factors such as “the greater frequency of divorce and remarriage, 
the percentage drop in marriage generally among our citizens . . . [and] the widespread 
adoption of some manner of ‘no fault’ divorce laws.”130 The court held the appellate 
                                                          
122 Id. at 503.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 503–04.
126 Id. at 506. Gross defined “overreaching” under the first condition as “used in the sense 
of one party by artifice or cunning, or by significant disparity to understand the nature of the 
transaction, to outwit or cheat the other.” Id. Parties satisfy the second condition by exhibiting 
an attachment to the prenuptial agreement containing a list of the assets of the parties to the 
agreement or by showing there had been a full disclosure by other means. Id. Finally, the third 
condition is generally present where the parties enter into “a [prenuptial] agreement which 
provides a significant sum either by way of property settlement or alimony at the time of a 
divorce, and after the lapse of an undue short period of time one of the parties abandons the 
marriage or otherwise disregards the marriage vows.” Id.
127 Id. at 505.
128 Id. One such public policy was “a potential for profitability when one spouse forfeits 
marital or conjugal rights.” Id. Under this scenario, divorce is encouraged where a spouse would 
profit by monetary means from divorce, contravening the state’s interest in the preservation of 
marriage. Id. “Second, the state is virtually a party to every marital contract in that it possesses 
a continuing concern in the financial security of divorced or separated persons.” Id.
129 Id.
130 Id.
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court erred in applying a fault-based view in which the breaching party is estopped 
from benefiting from his or her wrong.131 In addition, the court held the antenuptial 
provision limiting Mrs. Gross’s spousal support unenforceable because of its 
substantive unconscionability.132 The court acknowledged that Mrs. Gross’s standard 
of living dramatically changed between when the parties executed the agreement and 
when they filed for divorce.133 In so holding, the court reasoned that forcing Mrs. 
Gross to return to her prior standard of living could occasion hardship or be extremely 
difficult for the former wife.134
In Gross, the judiciary focused on the prenuptial agreement’s substantive fairness. 
The court considered the changed economic circumstances of the parties in 
determining whether the content of the agreement was substantively fair.135 Such 
considerations afford greater protection of a vulnerable spouse.136 In this respect, the 
UPAA differs from Ohio by allowing states to consider an agreement’s substantive 
fairness only when the party against whom enforcement is sought proves that he or 
she was not provided with a fair and reasonable financial disclosure of the spouse’s 
assets.137 This is a higher standard for substantive unconscionability because the court 
first must find that the adverse spouse was not provided a fair disclosure of assets 
before the court may consider the agreement’s reasonableness.138
Although more exacting, the UPAA’s approach to substantive fairness is more 
desirable than Ohio’s approach. Premised upon a theory of contract law, the UPAA 
treats premarital agreements as contracts. Thus, when a party acts deceptively or 
withholds facts, the adverse party may raise a defense to have the contract 
invalidated.139 Adoption of the UPAA would require Ohio courts to conduct a legal 
analysis before performing an equitable one. This would promote uniformity in 
premarital agreement law by requiring the party against whom enforcement is sought 
to first establish that the disclosure of assets was inadequate before permitting the 
                                                          
131 Id. at 508.
132 Id.; see generally In re Marriage of Shanks, 758 N.W.2d 506, 508 (Iowa 2008) (“The 
concept of unconscionability includes both procedural and substantive elements. Procedural 
unconscionability generally involves employment of sharp practices, the use of fine print and 
convoluted language, as well as a lack of understanding and an inequality of bargaining power. 
A substantive unconscionability analysis focuses on the harsh, oppressive, and one-sided terms 
of a contract”).
133 Gross, 464 N.E.2d at 510.
134 Id.
135 Id. at 506.
136 Simeone, in adhering to principles of contract law, reasoned that “everyone who enters 
into a long-term agreement knows that circumstances can change . . . . If parties choose not to 
address such matters in their prenuptial agreements, they must be regarded as having contracted 
to bear the risk of events that alter the value of their bargains.” Simeone v. Simeone, 581 A.2d 
162, 166 (Pa. 1990). This rule differs from the rule laid down in Gross, which permitted the 
court to consider the changed circumstances of the parties in determining whether an agreement 
was substantively fair. Gross, 464 N.E.2d at 511.
137 UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1983).
138 Id.
139 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
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court to perform an equitable analysis; this would provide prospective spouses with a 
meaningful opportunity to decide the terms of their marriage and possible divorce 
while preventing courts from invalidating provisions absent a showing of a wrong 
committed by one party. Such an analysis is appropriate when one considers that the 
role of the judiciary is to apply legal principles to facts,140 not to overreach in their 
interpretation of prenuptial agreements by considering whether or not the parties made 
a reasonable or fair bargain.
Thus, Ohio should adopt the UPAA because the Act’s approach to substantive 
fairness is more suitable for the aforementioned reasons. Adoption of the UPAA in 
Ohio and all other states would assist in achieving uniformity in prenuptial agreement 
enforcement by preventing courts from considering whether the agreement constitutes 
a reasonable bargain absent an initial showing of an inadequate financial disclosure.
B.    Ohio’s Protection of the Vulnerable Spouse Standard
Ohio common law analyzes prenuptial agreements under non-traditional contract 
law. Recall that in Part III.A of this Note, Gross held prenuptial agreements 
enforceable if they “have been entered into freely without fraud, duress, coercion or 
overreaching.”141 The language contained in this rule is analogous to general, 
contractual language. For example, it is well-settled that “where allegation[s] of fraud,
mistake, or material misrepresentation are made, extrinsic evidence may be allowed 
to interpret language in a written contract which is otherwise plain and 
unambiguous.”142 However, Gross found that the spousal support provision contained 
in the prenuptial agreement, which limited the former wife’s alimony, was 
unconscionable because her standard of living had changed dramatically from the time 
that the parties executed the agreement to the time they divorced.143 The court found 
the enforcement of the prenuptial agreement unfair because the terms of the agreement 
failed to account for changed circumstances during the marriage.144
Conversely, in jurisdictions that give deference to a party’s freedom to contract, if 
parties fail to plan for foreseeable risks such as changed circumstances, courts must 
presume the parties contracted to bear these risks.145 However, courts can use changes 
in circumstance as rationale for finding a prenuptial agreement invalid.146 Thus, as 
portrayed in Gross, a court’s preference for a reasonableness analysis contravenes 
principles of contract law because it presumes a failure to address changed 
circumstances in a prenuptial agreement is the equivalent of the parties’ conscious 
decision to bear the risks of the omission.
In addition, Gross held a prenuptial “contract voluntarily entered into during the 
period of engagement . . . valid when the provision for the [spouse] is fair and 
                                                          
140 Vitalius Tumonis, Legal Realism & Judicial Decision-Making, 12 JURIS. 1362, 1362 
(2012).
141 Gross, 464 N.E.2d at 506.
142 6 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN ET AL., CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 25.20 (Joseph M. Perillo et 
al. eds., 2017).
143 Gross, 464 N.E.2d at 510.
144 Id.
145 See, e.g., Simeone v. Simeone, 581 A.2d 162, 166 (Pa. 1990).
146 Gross, 464 N.E.2d at 510.
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reasonable under all the facts and circumstances.”147 These facts and circumstances 
could “exist when the disinherited spouse has substantial wealth of his or her own and 
the deceased spouse had children from a prior marriage who would be natural 
claimants to his or her bounty.”148 Yet, as previously stated, the Supreme Court of 
Ohio acknowledged that “[prenuptial] agreements are contracts and generally the law 
of contracts applies to their interpretation and application”; however, “these 
agreements constitute a special type of contract to which certain special rules
apply.”149 Although part of Gross’s holding is synonymous with contract law, the 
court’s analysis better aligns with jurisdictions that focus upon the reasonableness of 
the agreement, thereby protecting the economically disadvantaged party.
Zimmie analyzed the enforceability of a prenuptial agreement by emphasizing the 
temporal element, as the former wife first saw the agreement on the eve of the 
wedding, the absence of the former wife's independent counsel, and her testimony that 
she felt obligated to sign the agreement.150 In Zimmie, the court “voided the prenuptial 
contract for procedural unconscionability, [upon] finding that . . . the wife saw the 
prenuptial contract for the first time only one day prior to the wedding.”151 Yet, in 
Simeone, the court rejected the idea of evaluating the agreement’s conscionability, as 
“[c]ontracting parties are normally bound by their agreements, without regard to 
whether the terms thereof were read and fully understood and irrespective of whether 
the agreements embodied reasonable or good bargains.”152 Hence, in jurisdictions that 
purport to protect the vulnerable spouse, courts should consider the circumstances 
surrounding the execution of prenuptial agreements as well as whether the 
agreement’s terms are reasonable given the positions of the parties. Zimmie’s analysis 
falls within the ambit of such.
Some jurisdictions legally recognize the protection of the vulnerable spouse; 
however, the drafters of the UPAA, along with twenty-seven states, prefer to root 
judicial inquiries in the principles of freedom to contract.153 To achieve consistency in 
premarital agreement law, states must adopt a single, uniform standard. The discrete 
outcomes in these differing standards place the validity of prenuptial agreements in 
jeopardy whenever couples move to new jurisdictions. For Ohioans, the UPAA and 
its contractual freedom approach is appealing, especially because the Supreme Court 
of Ohio expressly acknowledged that prenuptial agreements are ordinary contracts.154
                                                          
147 Id. at 512 (Brown, J., concurring) (quoting Juhasz v. Juhasz, 16 N.E.2d 328 (Ohio 1938)).
148 Id. (citing Hook v. Hook, 431 N.E.2d 667 (Ohio 1982)).
149 Fletcher v. Fletcher, 628 N.E.2d 1343, 1346 (Ohio 1994) (emphasis added).
150 Zimmie v. Zimmie, 464 N.E.2d 142, 146 (Ohio 1984).
151 Joline F. Sikaitis, A New Form of Family Planning? The Enforceability of No-Child 
Provisions in Prenuptial Agreements, 54 CATH. U.L. REV. 355, 358 n.143 (2004); see also Larry 
A. DiMatteo, Equity’s Modification of Contract: An Analysis of the Twentieth Century’s 
Equitable Reformation of Contract Law, 33 New Eng. L. Rev. 265, 293 (1999) (“The doctrine 
of unconscionability has provided the means by which courts can begin to perform fairness
analysis of the substance of the contractual exchange”).
152 Simeone v. Simeone, 581 A.2d 162, 165 (Pa. 1990).
153 LINDA J. RAVDIN, PREMARITAL AGREEMENTS: DRAFTING AND NEGOTIATIONS 8 (2d ed. 
2017).
154 Fletcher, 628 N.E.2d at 1346.
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As stated infra, to achieve consistency and uniform treatment of prenuptial 
agreements, states like Ohio must conform to the majority approach, giving deference 
to the contractual freedom of prospective spouses.
C.    The UPAA’s Contractual Freedom Focus as the Appropriate Standard
Ohio should adopt the UPAA because the Act’s general approach affords parties 
freedom, within broad limits, to choose the financial terms of their marriage and 
divorce.155 This standard incorporates well-settled principles of contract law, i.e. 
absent fraud, misrepresentation, or duress, spouses should be bound by the terms of 
their agreements.156 Under this approach, prenuptial agreements are contracts, and 
courts should evaluate the agreements under the same criteria applicable to other types 
of contracts.157 Not all early adopters of the UPAA stringently adhere to such an 
approach.158 For example, Connecticut recognizes that “although a prenuptial 
agreement is a type of contract and must, therefore, comply with ordinary principles 
of contract law, the validity of such a contract depends on the circumstances of the 
particular case.”159 Although a majority of early adopter states slightly varied their 
enforcement standards for prenuptial agreements, their governing analyses are 
generally premised upon well-settled principles of contract law. 
Thus, to gain acceptance, the UPAA must establish first that it adheres to the 
contractual freedom standard.160 Section Three of the UPAA provides strong support 
for the assertion that the UPAA’s general approach is that parties are free to negotiate 
the terms of their marriage and divorce.161 This Section regulates the content of 
prenuptial agreements.162 The only matters excluded from its scope are criminal or 
unconscionable matters.163 Under this Section, parties may freely contract to the 
disposition of property upon separation; the marital dissolution or the occurrence or 
nonoccurrence of an event; the modification or elimination of spousal support; the 
choice of law governing the construction of the agreement; and any other matter, 
including the parties’ personal rights and obligations not in violation of public policy 
or a statute imposing a criminal penalty.164 Logic dictates that in mandating minimal 
restrictions, the UPAA has implicitly affirmed a spouse’s right to contractual freedom. 
In addition, Section Two of the UPAA defines the marriage as consideration for a 
                                                          
155 UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1983).
156 Simeone, 581 A.2d at 165.
157 Id.
158 Bedrick v. Bedrick, 17 A.3d 17 (Conn. 2011).
159 Id. at 25.
160 Chelsea Biemiller, The Uncertain Enforceability of Prenuptial Agreements: Why the 
“Extreme” Approach in Pennsylvania Is the Right Approach for Review, 6 DREXEL L. REV. 133, 
148 (2013).
161 UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 3 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1983).
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163 ULC, Why States Should Adopt UPAA, supra note 19.
164 UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 3 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1983).
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prenuptial agreement.165 Consideration, as a basic tenant of contract law,166 lends 
further support to the notion that the UPAA intended for courts to consider and 
evaluate prenuptial agreements as ordinary contracts. Furthermore, the UPAA 
expressly states that “a premarital agreement is a contract,” and the provisions 
contained within the Act “may be enforced to the extent that they are enforceable . . . 
under otherwise applicable law.”167 Thus, the UPAA takes the position that prenuptial 
agreements are ordinary contracts that courts should enforce pursuant to traditional 
contract law.
Accordingly, states that have adopted the UPAA agree that prenuptial agreements 
are ordinary contracts.168 Also, other states, like Pennsylvania, that have yet to adopt 
the UPAA require that prenuptial agreements “be evaluated under the same criteria as 
are applicable to other types of contracts.”169 Hence, the prevailing view is that courts 
should analyze prenuptial agreements under traditional contract law. 
In Reed v. Reed,170 the court expressed a convincing argument supporting the 
contractual freedom standard. In Reed, the appellate court overturned the trial court’s 
ruling that the prenuptial agreement was void given the length of the parties’ marriage 
and the growth of the parties’ assets over the years.171 The appellate court found that 
“the parties’ prenuptial agreement [was] clear and unambiguous, [and that] changed 
circumstances [did] not render its enforcement unfair and unreasonable.”172 Justifying 
its decision, the court cited well-settled principles of prenuptial agreement law, stating, 
“[c]ourts cannot make contracts. They can only construe them . . . . In keeping with 
this principle, it necessarily follows that parties who negotiate and ratify [prenuptial] 
agreements should do so with the confidence that their expressed intent will be upheld 
and enforced by the courts.”173 The court in Reed opined that the contractual freedom 
standard was appropriate because courts are not in the business of making contracts.174
Instead, courts should enforce prenuptial agreements in accordance with the terms set 
forth by the parties.175 Arguably, when a court invalidates a prenuptial agreement 
because it is substantively “unfair,” the court is substituting its judgment for that of 
the parties.176 Thus, by invalidating freely and voluntarily executed prenuptial 
agreements effectuated by competent and consenting adults for any reason other than 
                                                          
165 Id. § 2.
166 2 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN ET AL., CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §5.2 (Joseph M. Perillo et al. 
eds., 2017).
167 UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 2 cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1983).
168 RAVDIN, supra note 153, at 8–9.
169 Raiken v. Mellon, 582 A.2d 11, 11 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990); see Simeone v. Simeone, 581 
A.2d 162, 165 (Pa. 1990).
170 Reed v. Reed, 693 N.W.2d 825, 836 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005).
171 Id. at 833.
172 Id. at 836.
173 Id. at 835–36.
174 Id. at 835.
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176 See, e.g., id.
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grave violations of public policy or criminal acts, the court is “making” or modifying 
an otherwise valid contract. This is an inappropriate act or role of the judiciary.
In addition, as stated supra, the contractual freedom standard is appropriate 
because marriage, itself, is recognized as a contract.177 Execution of a marriage 
contract creates a personal and legal relationship between the parties,178 and the law 
intervenes to hold these parties to various obligations and liabilities.179 If courts 
consider marriage a contract by which parties acquire enforceable, legal obligations, 
logically, courts should consider and evaluate premarital agreements as contracts as 
well.
Within the ambit of social progress, the contractual freedom standard is more 
appropriate, especially given the improved status of women as equals in modern 
society.180 Indeed, “[i]n other areas, the law has developed to assume that all similarly 
situated people, regardless of gender, stand on equal footing and should receive equal 
treatment under the law . . . . [Therefore, the law] should do the same for those 
individuals about to enter into marriage.”181 The standard embraced by Ohio, 
protecting the vulnerable spouse, undermines women’s status as equal marital partners 
capable of contracting.182 Likewise, courts “run the risk of paternalism by recognizing 
that the achievement of gender equality requires more than equal treatment—it may 
demand protection of women as a disadvantaged socioeconomic class.”183 Although 
in the past women commonly relied on their husbands to provide for them 
financially,184 the number of women in the workforce has greatly increased.185 Thus, 
the protection of the vulnerable spouse treats women as incapable of contracting 
voluntarily and “presumes that women [are] unable to understand the contracts they 
sign.”186 This standard suggests that “[w]omen are less powerful than men and need 
societal protection in the form of voiding the bargains they strike.”187 This obsolete 
                                                          
177 But cf. Maynard v. Hill, 128 U.S. 190, 210–11 (1988) (“[W]hilst marriage is often termed 
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standard threatens to dissipate considerable advances and modern progress made in 
the area of women’s rights—namely, the recognition of women as equals.
To achieve consist and uniform treatment of prenuptial agreements, all states 
should adopt the UPAA standard for analyzing prenuptial agreements. This 
proposition becomes compelling when one considers the inherent difference in 
analyses and subsequent outcomes that flow from inconsistent standards.188 Ohio 
should conform to the views of a majority of states and adopt the UPAA’s contractual 
freedom standard to reduce ambiguity and promote reliable interpretations for 
prenuptial agreements in all jurisdictions. 
D.    Practical Issues with Competing Standards
Ohio should adopt the UPAA’s contractual freedom standard. Competing 
standards for analyzing prenuptial agreements present practical problems for
prospective spouses attempting to draft valid and binding agreements that are able to 
withstand judicial scrutiny in multiple jurisdictions. In In re Marriage of Rahn, a 
couple effectuated a prenuptial agreement in another state and sought to enforce it in 
Colorado.189 Under Colorado law, “if a prenuptial agreement was entered into in good 
faith, with full and fair disclosure, and without fraud or overreaching, the agreement 
was held to be valid and enforceable.”190 Mrs. Rahn sought to invalidate the agreement
because her husband failed to disclose the value or existence of his pension plan.191
Instead, the court found in her husband’s favor and upheld the prenuptial agreement, 
finding Mrs. Rahn had general knowledge of his assets.192
This case exemplifies some of the issues created from competing standards of 
enforceability, as the parties executed a prenuptial agreement in one state and 
subsequently sought enforcement in another. An Ohio court would likely have 
invalidated the prenuptial agreement at issue in In re Marriage of Rahn if Mrs. Rahn 
gave credible testimony that she did not receive a full and accurate disclosure of her 
husband’s assets.193 Such conflicting outcomes “subject the parties to the risk that the 
validity and enforceability of their contract will be judged by standards and rules that 
did not exist in the state where the contract was drafted.”194
Similarly, in In re Marriage of Bonds,195 Barry Bonds, a professional baseball 
player, and Sun, his Swedish wife, married in Las Vegas, Nevada in 1988.196 In 1987, 
Sun moved to Arizona to live with Barry.197 The morning before their flight to Las 
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Vegas, the couple met with Barry’s attorney and signed a prenuptial agreement198
containing a complete waiver of spousal support.199 Moreover, Sun was not 
represented by independent legal counsel.200 At the time of the divorce proceedings, 
the couple lived in California where Sun was a stay-at-home mother of their two 
children; Barry was earning $8,000,000 annually as a professional baseball player.201
Prior to trial, the court considered whether Arizona or California law should govern 
the interpretation of the prenuptial agreement.202 The trial court declined to apply 
California law upon concluding “that the parties could not have anticipated that they 
were going to live in California.”203 The trial court subsequently enforced the 
prenuptial agreement.204 The appellate court reversed, however, applying California 
law and holding that under the totality of the circumstances, the prenuptial agreement 
was invalid.205 The Supreme Court of California was silent on the appellate court’s 
choice of law ruling,206 but held that the prenuptial agreement was valid except for the 
waiver of spousal support, which was unenforceable pursuant to California public 
policy.207
In re marriage of Bonds illustrates the pragmatic concerns underlying choice-of-
law issues that courts must face when deciding which law to apply to enforce 
prenuptial agreements executed in another state. Under Ohio law, courts would likely 
invalidate the prenuptial agreement in Bonds due to the inequality of bargaining power 
between the parties coupled with the absence of independent legal counsel for the 
former wife.208 An Ohio court would have applied Arizona law to the Bonds’ 
prenuptial agreement because Ohio’s choice-of-law rules provide: “in the absence of 
an effective choice by the parties, the Second Restatement requires application of a 
most significant relationship test.”209 Thus, if an Ohio court determined that the parties 
had a significant relationship with the State of Arizona, then Arizona law would 
govern the interpretation of the prenuptial agreement. Adoption of the UPAA in all 
states would minimize the effect that choice-of-law determinations have on prenuptial 
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agreement interpretations because each state would apply the same uniform 
standard.210
This is significant because the primary reason choice-of-law determinations are 
repeatedly at issue in prenuptial agreements is because the applicable state law often 
changes the outcome of the proceeding.211 The obliteration of competing standards 
and subsequent adoption of the UPAA will enable couples to effectuate binding 
premarital contracts, guaranteeing consistent enforcement across state lines.
E.    The UPAA Incorporates Accepted Standards of State Laws
Ohio should adopt the UPAA because the Act incorporates accepted standards of 
existing state laws. For example, Section Three of the UPAA regulates the content of 
prenuptial agreements.212 As stated supra, nothing is excluded from the scope of the 
agreement except matters that are criminal or unconscionable.213 Every state prohibits 
prospective spouses from contracting to anything illegal in the prenuptial 
agreement.214 Hence, the UPAA’s regulation of prenuptial agreement content, 
although liberal in nature, is uniformly practiced in every state.
A significant number of states permit parties to include a provision to modify or 
eliminate spousal support; however, the rules vary as to the limitations imposed on 
such provisions.215 Under the UPAA, a provision that modifies or eliminates a 
spouse’s right to spousal support will be invalidated if enforcement of the provision 
would leave one party destitute.216 The test is “whether, within a reasonable period of 
time following the divorce, it is probable . . . that the deprived spouse will become a 
public charge if the limitation or waiver of alimony is enforced.”217 California and 
South Dakota are the only two states that have eliminated this section from their 
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versions of the UPAA.218 “However, California case law indicates that spousal support 
waivers are not contrary to public policy and are not per se void or unenforceable.”219
Conversely, some states prohibit waiver of spousal support provisions on the 
theory that such provisions encourage divorce and are void as against public policy.220
Nevertheless, several states still permit spouses to contract to such spousal support 
provisions.221 The UPAA adopts accepted state standards governing spousal support 
provisions within prenuptial agreements.
In addition, Section Six of the UPAA provides grounds for avoiding enforcement 
of a prenuptial agreement.222 First, premarital agreements are not enforceable if the 
party against whom enforcement is sought proves that the parties did not enter into the 
agreement voluntarily.223 This requirement is another accepted standard in all states.224
For example, Ohio “requires that the agreement be freely entered into without fraud, 
duress, coercion or overreaching.”225 This language is analogous to the language in 
Section Six of the UPAA, which states “an agreement remains unenforceable if the 
attacking party proves, by the preponderance of the evidence, it was not voluntary, or 
was the product of fraud, duress, coercion, or overreaching.”226 Hence, the 
requirement that parties voluntarily execute prenuptial agreements is an accepted 
standard of enforcement in all states.
Ohio is among a significant minority in its interpretation of prenuptial 
agreements.227 Arguably, Ohio and similar jurisdictions possess second-tier views to 
the corresponding governing standards. Inevitably, all states, upon recognizing the 
importance of uniform treatment of prenuptial agreements, will have to compromise 
on which standards and principles should govern. Such a compromise is essential to 
ensure preservation of the rights of spouses to contract freely in prenuptial agreements. 
The wisdom of twenty-seven state legislatures reinforces the widespread acceptance 
of the UPAA’s standards. Therefore, adopting these accepted standards would allow 
uniform treatment and consistent outcomes in the enforcement of prenuptial 
agreements, providing adequate and reliable guidance for judicial interpretation of 
prenuptial agreements.
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F.    The UPAA Incorporates a Flexible Framework
Another reason why Ohio should adopt the UPAA is because the Act provides a 
flexible framework for interpreting prenuptial agreements. The UPAA’s flexible 
framework allows states to make minor modifications prior to enacting their own
versions of the UPAA.228 For example, regarding child support provisions, the UPAA 
states that a prenuptial agreement may not adversely affect the right to child support.229
Utah’s modification of this section provides that “in addition to the right to child 
support not being adversely affected by a premarital agreement, the medical insurance, 
the health and medical provider expenses, and the child-care coverage cannot be 
affected by such an agreement.”230 Connecticut added a discretionary clause to its 
version of the UPAA, stating that “any provision relating to the custody, visitation, 
and care or any other statement affecting a child shall be subject to judicial review and 
modification.”231 Currently, in Ohio, “all issues related to child support, custody and 
visitation included in a prenuptial agreement will not be enforced by the court . . . 
because these issues are decided by the court based upon what is in the child’s best 
interest.”232 The Act’s flexible framework would allow the Ohio Legislature to craft 
its own version of the UPAA, similar to Connecticut’s version, subjecting child 
support provisions in prenuptial agreements to judicial review. Ultimately, as more 
states adopt the UPAA, Ohio will have to compromise and defer to the UPAA’s 
governing standards.233 However, as demonstrated here, Ohio can preserve some of 
its common law principles without hindering the uniform application of the UPAA 
across state lines.
Many states have adopted modified versions of the UPAA; yet, these states still 
adhere to the Act’s general framework. For example, California requires “fair, 
reasonable and full disclosure of the property or financial obligations of the other 
party.”234 The UPAA “requires only ‘fair and reasonable disclosure.’”235 Thus, 
“[u]nder the UPAA, less than full disclosure might be acceptable.”236 Similarly, 
Illinois “allows for a provision of the premarital agreement dealing with the 
modification or elimination of support to be changed by a court to avoid the party 
against whom enforcement is sought from suffering undue hardship.”237 Finally, the 
Indiana version of the UPAA implies that although a “premarital agreement that 
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causes one spouse to be forced onto public assistance may be unconscionable, a better 
test for unconscionability is to compare the situations of both parties.”238 Overall, the 
UPAA’s flexible framework provides Ohio with the unique opportunity to merge 
traditional Ohio prenuptial agreement principles with the UPAA, thereby contributing 
to the uniform application of prenuptial agreement law across state lines.
G.    The UPAA Promotes Uniformity
Ohio should adopt the UPAA because the Act promotes uniform enforcement of 
prenuptial agreements. The ULC, in promulgating the UPMAA, explained that the 
UPAA “brought . . . consistency to the legal treatment of premarital agreements,” but 
ultimately concluded that “uniformity has declined as states have amended the act in 
various ways throughout the years.”239 Despite its variations, the UPAA continues to 
promote uniformity because it eliminates the existence of diametrically opposed 
standards and adopts a more uniform approach—the contractual freedom standard.240
Continuing this abolition of competing standards will eradicate the need for courts to 
constantly assess substantive fairness because, under the UPAA, states may consider 
the substantive fairness of the agreement only when the party against whom 
enforcement is sought proves that he or she was not provided a fair and reasonable 
financial disclosure.241 Furthermore, adoption of the UPAA will eliminate content 
assessments because the UPAA permits parties to contract to a wide range of subject 
matters.242 Eventually, adoption of the UPAA could even phase out individual state 
content restrictions altogether on terms such as child or spousal support. 
The UPAA also promotes uniformity by minimizing splits in authority. For 
example, “there is a split in authority among the states as to whether a premarital 
agreement may control the issue of spousal support.”243 A growing trend exists where 
parties may contractually alter spousal support if certain standards are met.244 As more 
states adopt the UPAA, more trends will emerge. Ohio and Connecticut agree that 
child support, visitation, and custody are best left to family courts;245 yet, several states 
disagree and permit broad freedom to contract provided the right to child support is 
not adversely affected.246 Thus, if every state adopts the UPAA, a majority rule will 
likely emerge, thereby minimizing splits in authority. As a result, the widespread 
adoption of the UPAA would promote uniform treatment of prenuptial agreements. 
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IV.    CONFRONTING THE COUNTERARGUMENT: STATES WILL BE RELUCTANT TO 
ADOPT THE UPMAA
As stated supra, the ULC approved the UPMAA at its annual conference on July 
18, 2012247 after half of the states failed to adopt the UPAA.248 Commentators have 
suggested that the state variations of the UPAA were significant, preventing uniform 
treatment of prenuptial agreements across state lines.249 Because states traditionally 
governed premarital and marital agreements under separate legal standards, the ULC 
sought to unify the interpretation of such agreements under one set of procedures.250
Some argue that states may have undermined uniformity by modifying and 
enacting their own versions of the UPAA; however, scholars refute these claims, 
arguing that “many of these changes have no significant impact on [a] state’s adoption 
of the UPAA.”251 Consider the Arkansas Premarital Agreement Act, similar to the 
UPAA, which requires a prenuptial agreement be in writing and signed by both 
parties.252 Unlike the UPAA, Arkansas’s Act also requires “the agreement . . . 
be acknowledged by both parties.”253 Florida “allows a premarital agreement to be 
held unenforceable if the party against whom enforcement is sought can prove the 
‘agreement was the product of fraud, duress, coercion or overreaching.’”254 Florida, 
thus, builds upon the UPAA’s general requirement that parties execute prenuptial 
agreements voluntarily, enacting additional enforceability requirements that could 
render a prenuptial agreement invalid.255 Overall, although many states add 
modifications to the UPAA provisions, they have not impeded the uniform application 
of the UPAA’s governing standards across state lines.
If one views the UPAA as a safety net, this proposition becomes compelling. 
Essentially, the UPAA mandates minimal formal requirements—the agreement must 
be in writing and signed by both parties.256 Additional formalities, like Arkansas’s 
additional provision, do not change the underlying rules prohibiting parties from orally 
executing prenuptial agreements.257 Florida’s inquiry into whether the prenuptial 
agreements overreach, similarly, does not hinder the UPAA’s provision requiring 
voluntary execution in prenuptial agreements.258 Voluntariness operates as a safety 
net; stated differently, it is the bare minimum required to justify enforcing a prenuptial 
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agreement. Overreaching operates as an additional factor courts could consider in 
determining whether the agreement was sufficiently voluntary.259 Other states have 
made similar changes such as rearranging the organizational structure of the UPAA, 
modifying provisional language, eliminating subsections, and adding subsections.260
Despite these variations, the Act’s original provisions remain significantly unharmed 
in every manifestation, likely because the UPAA provides such a broad, general 
framework for enforcement of prenuptial agreements.261 Thus, states may continue to 
enact their own variations, while the overall framework and substance of the UPAA 
protects uniformity.
In the prefatory note of the UPMAA, the ULC said critics attacked the UPAA as 
insufficient in its protection of the vulnerable spouse.262 The UPAA says, in relevant 
parts, that “a premarital agreement is a contract,” and the Act’s provisions “may be 
enforced to the extent that they are enforceable . . . under otherwise applicable law.”263
Logically, courts should evaluate a contract under traditional principles of contract 
law. Many states have expressed agreement by adopting the UPAA.264 States that 
agree with the UPAA’s approach will be reluctant to adopt the UPMAA as the Act’s 
revised focus centered around the protection of the vulnerable spouse.265
Unfortunately, this view would require a significant number of states to alter 
materially their prenuptial agreement laws, focusing, instead, on whether an 
agreement is substantively fair and includes a reasonable bargain.266 These goals are 
unrealistic; the ULC essentially expects a majority of states to unravel years of 
jurisprudence overnight to preserve uniform prenuptial agreement laws.267
Simultaneously, the commission endorsed two opposing standards contained within 
two different prenuptial agreement acts.268 In addition, the UPMAA’s attempts to 
bring both marital and premarital agreements into its scope269 decreases the likelihood 
that states will adopt it. The ULC, itself, conceded that most states analyze premarital 
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and marital agreements under entirely different legal standards.270 Regardless, many 
of the state variations of the UPAA are insignificant in terms of impact on uniformity. 
Thus, Ohio should adopt the UPAA’s accepted state standards, flexible framework, 
and contractual freedom approach to prenuptial agreement interpretation.
V. CONCLUSION
In today’s society, emerging awareness among prospective spouses of the need to 
settle marital issues between themselves before marriage271 has led to an increase in 
prenuptial agreements.272 Couples in the United States commonly live in several states 
throughout the course of their marriage.273 Such circumstances have caused individual 
states to establish prenuptial agreement laws that differ in both formal and substantive 
ways.274 As a result of non-uniform treatment of prenuptial agreements across state 
lines,275 the ULC drafted the UPAA as a remedial measure.276 Currently, Ohio remains 
one of twenty-three states yet to adopt the UPAA.277 Ohio’s adoption of the UPAA 
would clarify the rights and responsibilities of parties subject to prenuptial 
agreements; subsequent adoption of the Act in all states would guarantee reliable 
prenuptial agreements which could withstand judicial scrutiny in all jurisdictions. 
Moreover, Ohio’s adoption of the UPAA would conform to state precedent. Ohio 
law currently adheres to the UPAA’s enforceability requirements—that premarital 
agreements are unenforceable if the party against whom enforcement is sought proves 
that the parties did not execute the agreement voluntarily or that the agreement was 
unconscionable.278 In addition, because of the UPAA’s flexible framework, Ohio 
legislatures may create their own version of the UPAA to complement existing Ohio 
law.279 The only significant departure from current Ohio law would occur in the 
absence of an inadequate disclosure of assets, which, under the UPAA, allows 
prenuptial agreements to be invalidated only upon a showing of fraud, 
misrepresentation, or duress.280 This departure is a small, legal concession that would 
ensure that courts uphold respective intents of parties when dictating crucial terms of 
their marriage and divorce. In time, Ohio’s adoption of the UPAA would be a 
significant step toward the ultimate goal—adoption of the UPAA across all fifty states. 
Nationwide adoption of the UPAA would encourage and permit prospective spouses 
wishing to solidify their terms of marriage and divorce to do so through binding and 
valid legal instruments.
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